

The revolution now prevailing in this island has already lasted two weeks, and if the government of the U.S. does not act more effectively than it has apparently been doing, American and other foreign interests in Cuba, which are enormously important, will suffer very seriously.

General Menocal will have great difficulty in suppressing the revolt, and even if the rebels after fighting a few weeks are beaten and dispersed the revolution would not end. It would before long break out again. The motives for the present uprising are very powerful, which is a factor in the problem not to be overlooked.

The revolution can continue in a sporadic ~~intermittent~~ form indefinitely and would not only prove a heavy drain on the resources of the government but would veru seriously affect the economic life of the rural districts from which the country derives its wealth.

Should the government of the U.S. uphold and aid general Menocal, and in this way become a party to the contest, it is not impossible that the insurgents driven to despair, might by way of reprisal set about destroying the immensely valuable crops of cane, the sugar mills, the railroads and other properties of American citizens, and there would be no way of preventing them from doing so. The rebels would be likely to act on the theory that the government of the U.S. would rather enter into some arrangement with them (supposing that general Menocal refused to do so) than invite the destruction of American and other foreign property in the island. In this connection it is worth while recalling the opinion of Messrs Taft and Bacon in 1906, when the revolution against President Palma:

"It would not have been difficult for the government forces, united with our bluejackets and marines which were available a few days after we reached the island, to drive back the insurgent forces, and with the first expedition of 6000 troops of our Army it would have been a matter of a short time before the insurgents would have been dispersed into small guerrilla bands. But those who suggested to us - and there were some - that a firm stand by the U.S. government against the rebels would lead them to disarm and disperse to their homes did not understand the temper of such a body of men or the considerations which moved them. The ease with which they might be overcome in a pitched battle and driven back by a trained force much less in number can not at all be made the basis for an inference that by a show of force of this kind they could be induced to surrender and lay down their arms... If forcible measures had been taken by the U.S. the insurrection could doubtless have been suppressed, but it would have been a work of a year or more and would have cost much blood and money".

There has never been so much wealth in the rural districts of Cuba as there is at present, and if it were destroyed it could never be adequately paid for or replaced.

The pacification of Cuba has been carried out on two occasions by the U.S. (after the war with Spain and in 1906) without employing force. BUT by aiding and supporting general Menocal in the present conflict the U.S. would create a situation the solution of which would depend solely on the use of force. There would be no alternative left the revolutionists but to set force against force, and the torch has always proved the most effective weapon of revolutionists in Cuba.

Has the U.S. anything to gain by arraying itself on the side of one of the parties to a civil war in a foreign country? This partisan intervention would bind the U.S. to the defense of some interest not its own. By aiding and upholding general Menocal the U.S. would be serving the interests of Menocal, not the interests of the U.S. Menocal has brought about this civil war through his efforts to obtain reelection by illegitimate means, and if the U.S. helps him to wage this war the only result will be to prolong an intolerable situation in Cuba.

The interests of American citizens in Cuba are best promoted by the U.S. adopting a neutral and impartial attitude. Let the U.S. side with neither of the two warring factions, but declare that its prime interest is the protection of American lives and properties and the speedy pacification of the island. This is a reasonable attitude, and demands for a peaceful settlement based on this policy addressed to both factions would be likely to prove effective. The policy of siding with the faction in control of the government against the revolutionists is, on the other hand, calculated to provoke reprisal on the part of the latter and bring about the destruction of American property, which is the very thing the U.S. is most concerned to prevent.

Nothing is to be gained by punishing the rebels after the immensely valuable properties of American citizens have been destroyed. The amount of damage that could be done by the rebels in a few hours would be far greater than any indemnity that could possibly be obtained from the Cuban treasury in many years. The sugar estates alone represent hundreds of millions of dollars, and the railroads are not far behind in value. What is the sense of putting this property in imminent risk of going up into smoke for the sake of supporting the faction now in control of the government in Cuba, against its opponent in arms?

General Menocal and his faction do not deserve to be kept in con

of the government for another four years and cannot be sustained as a stable and legitimate government, even with the support of the U. S.

Governments must derive their just powers from the consent of the governed: this is, as true in Spanish American countries as it is anywhere else in the world. It is, therefore, as important to insist that governments in Spanish America should be legitimate in their origin and exercise their powers with moderation and justice, as it is to insist that revolutions ought not to be tolerated. If Presidents in office did not abuse their power to obtain their reelection and to control the will of the people, revolutions would very likely die out. Nothing can be more reasonable than to require the men who hold office in a Republic to conduct themselves with moderation and justice as well as to respect the laws. If they do not do so, can those under their authority be called upon to exercise prudence and be asked to submit to outrage and injury at the hands of their rulers? If Presidents in these Spanish American republics were not so bent on remaining in power at all odds, and so ready to abuse their powers, the "revolutionary habit" would no doubt cease and the law-abiding example of the rulers would be imitated by the citizens. Returning to the case of Cuba, whatever one's mental attitude may be toward a revolution, the fact must be faced that general Menocal put the Liberals up to the alternative of either acquiescing more or less willingly in his usurpation of the government for the next four years, or of getting up a revolution. The elections were held quite peacefully on the 1st of November, to the great satisfaction of the whole country. Circumstances not at all difficult to explain gave the victory to the Liberal party, at least in four out of the six provinces. The results of over two-thirds of the votes cast were made public by the government and the defeat was for a few hours accepted by general Menocal and his supporters. But on the evening of November the 2nd a sudden change came over the situation. It now began to be proclaimed that the returns were erroneous, no more figures were given out for publication, and a plan was put into practice for converting defeat into victory. The certificates of votes cast at different polls and the packages of ballots which were still in the hands of the Post Office on their way to the Central Electoral Board at Havana were seized and forgery was brought into play in order to modify the general result

of the elections. These forgeries gave rise to a heated and most complicated litigation before the Central Electoral Board and on appeal before the Supreme Court in accordance with the law of Cuba.

This litigation ended favorably for the Liberals, if we consider that their claims were almost invariably sustained and that many of the frauds did not prevail, but the decisions of the Court unfortunately did not determine to whom the final victory belonged. In a small number of wards in the provinces of Oriente and Santa Clara the elections which had been annulled had to be repeated or not having been effected were now to be held. If the Liberals carried one of the two provinces their victory was assured; the Conservatives, on the contrary, unless they carried both provinces, would not win the presidency. In Oriente the advantages were about equal, but in Santa Clara the Liberals led by 1164 votes. In the six wards of this province, in which the by-elections were to be held, there were however only 2401 voters registered. It was therefore highly improbable that the Liberal majority of 1164 votes could be overbalanced. The Conservative party nevertheless proclaimed that it had every probability of winning, not only in Oriente but in Santa Clara as well. The elections in the latter province were fixed for the 14th of February, but before this date the revolution started although apparently planned to occur after the by-elections. The reason why the revolt preceded them seems to have been because in Havana the government got wind of the conspiracy and began to make arrests.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the struggle which commenced on the 2nd of November was essentially between the Liberal party on the one hand and the President of the Republic and his supporters who controlled the government, on the other. This control made it possible to forge electoral certificates in the Post Office, to put a stop to the publication of the returns, to hold the telegraph and telephone lines almost exclusively for their own ends during the days immediately following the elections and to use the influence of the central government in many ways to further their designs.

The forgeries and other methods above referred to were not the only agencies set in motion by general Menocal's supporters after the 2nd of November. A formidable agitation was organized against the Liberals who were now accused of having employed violence and fraud before and during the elections of the 1st of November, and of threatening the government with revolution. On the basis of this the supporters of general Menocal declared

the Conservatives had won, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary, that they would meet force with force, and they made it plain that the determination to keep Menocal in office for another four years was irrevocable. Menocal's supporters, who held high offices, made strong statements to the newspapers calculated to ~~excite~~ create a feeling of animosity against the Liberals, and the press, controlled in large part by the government, was used to the utmost to inflame the public spirit. When the Central Electoral Board and the Supreme Court handed down their decisions contrary to the pretensions of Menocal's supporters, the most defamatory accusations were freely made against these high tribunals. When the Liberals asked the leaders of the Conservative party and the government to agree with them upon some means by which the by-elections might be conducted so that both parties would be assured of absolute fair ~~play~~ play, general Menocal and his supporters squarely declined to enter into any such agreement. A few days before the date fixed for the by-elections in the province of Santa Clara Dr. Zayas and a committee of Liberals made a visit of inspection to the wards in which the voting was to take place and discovered that a large number of criminals who had just been pardoned had been sent out to these districts to intimidate the liberal voters, that the officers in command of the troops were men who were well known for their hostility to the Liberals, that some of the booths had been placed in the woods, and in general that there could be no doubt that the plan of Menocal's supporters was to win the elections one way or the other. The Liberals, moreover, had no means of preventing the election certificates from being forged as had been done on November the 2nd and the days immediately following, when it was found that Menocal had been defeated. ~~It is noted in 1901 in exhibits~~

The Liberal party from the evening of November the 2nd and throughout this trying period made great efforts to keep the problem within the sphere of law, and in accordance with this determination appealed to the Central Electoral Board and to the Supreme Court. ^{and} The Liberal party likewise made many attempts to work in harmony with the Conservative party and requested general Menocal to provide adequate guarantees that there would be no frauds committed after the polls were closed and that everything would be done peacefully and according to law. But both the Conservative party and general Menocal refused to entertain any of the Liberal proposals. The attitude of many prominent conservatives, including the Vi

Vice-president of the Republic Dr. Enrique José Varona, was, however, entirely favorable to the Liberal proposals.

Thus ~~that~~ there was overwhelming evidence that general Menocal was bent on staying in office against all odds. The dilemma which faced the Liberals was either to ~~accept~~ acquiesce in this usurpation of the government or to prevent it by force.

Menocal's supporters from November the 2nd were defending an illegal cause. The methods which they were employing to win an election which had really been lost were subversive of the law and led directly to revolution.

It is therefore plain that the U.S. is under no moral obligation to support Menocal, much less to fight his battles. On the other hand, to side with the rebels would be bad policy. The only course is to proclaim the neutrality of the U.S., to insist that no American or foreign properties be destroyed, and to urge strongly upon the Cubans, not upon Menocal and the rebels alone, but upon the people of Cuba as a whole, to put a speedy end to the anarchy of civil war. By acting in this friendly spirit the U.S. can get a great deal out of the Cubans who are easily led by persuasion. Not until this plan has been tried and found ineffective should the U.S. enter upon another line of conduct.

During the revolt against Estrada Palma in 1906 general Menocal tried to bring about an understanding between the government and the insurgents, but hostilities were suspended at his request and peace proposals were discussed. The efforts failed because President Palma finally decided that he would enter into no agreement with rebels. Considering general Menocal's attitude in 1906, it is not unreasonable to ask him now, when he is in President Palma's situation, to accept a truce and to consider the best means of peacefully terminating the deplorable state of things into which the Republic has fallen.

There is ^{one} no man or group of men in Cuba today who could with any hope of success approach general Menocal and the rebels and ask them to submit their quarrel to an arbitration. It would therefore seem to be the duty of President Wilson to take this step and to suggest that the American government appoint one or more officials of the U.S. to act as such arbitrators. If this mediation ~~is~~ proved ineffective the strong hand of the U.S. would eventually have to establish peace, but this would be a death

blow for the Republic.

After peace is restored and some agreement acceptable to both parties at war in Cuba has been adopted, it will be time for the U.S. to consider what measures ought to be taken to prevent a repetition of the intolerable state of affairs which has been brought about in the island.

C o n c l u s i o n s :

First - Menocal's continuance in office after the 20th of May would be equivalent to a usurpation of the government and would not therefore be an acceptable solution.

Second - The forcible pacification of the island cannot be successfully accomplished by general Menocal, and if the U.S. undertook to assist him, such a step would not only cost much blood and money but would probably occasion the destruction of a great part of the immensely valuable properties of Americans in Cuba.

Third - The mediation of the U.S. looking to a just and adequate settlement of the conflict between the faction supporting Menocal and the insurgents would be likely to restore peace and provide at the same time for the reestablishment of a stable government without unnecessary bloodshed and destruction of property.

